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Abstract
According to the “Lesser of Two Evils Argument,” deployment of solar radiation
management (SRM) geoengineering in a climate emergency would be morally justified because
it likely would be the best option available. A prominent objection to this argument is that a
climate emergency might constitute a genuine moral dilemma in which SRM would be
impermissible even if it was the best option. However, while conceiving of a climate emergency
as a moral dilemma accounts for some ethical concerns about SRM, it requires the controversial
claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas, and it potentially undermines moral actionguidance in emergency scenarios. Instead, I argue that it is better to conceive of climate
emergencies as situations calling for agent-regret. This allows us coherently to hold that SRM
may be morally problematic even if it ought to be deployed in some scenario.

Introduction
Given the lack of sufficient progress on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, some
climate scientists are calling for research on geoengineering techniques, or technologies that
could be used to modify the global environment and potentially avert some impacts of climate
change. In particular, some are advocating research on solar radiation management (SRM), or
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geoengineering techniques that would increase the Earth’s albedo and thus introduce some
degree of global cooling that could compensate for emissions-driven global warming. For
example, sulfate aerosol injections could increase the albedo of the stratosphere, reflecting an
increased fraction of incoming solar radiation. Proponents of researching SRM note that such a
technique could be relatively inexpensive and potentially fast-acting, making it useful in a
climate emergency, or a scenario in which impending climatic impacts would result in
substantial harm. 1
However, many SRM techniques, if deployed, have the potential to result in substantial
harm and injustice. 2 For example, SRM could alter regional precipitation patterns, causing
drought in some regions; it could cause ozone depletion; it would not address the problem of
ocean acidification; and it carries the so-called “termination problem,” or the possibility that
SRM would be discontinued abruptly, resulting in rapid and dangerous global warming. 3 While
each of these outcomes could be substantially harmful to various parties, the harms and benefits
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of SRM also could be distributed in an unjust fashion. 4 There are also ethical concerns about
researching SRM, such as risks of harm involved in large-scale field tests. 5 Despite these ethical
concerns, one might think that SRM nonetheless warrants serious consideration, given the risks
of harm and injustice associated with climate change.
In this paper, I examine an argument that SRM deployment would be morally justified in
a climate emergency because it likely would be the best option available (or the least bad option,
if no goods ones are available). I also consider an objection to this argument, namely that a
climate emergency would constitute a genuine moral dilemma and hence SRM deployment
would be impermissible even if it was the best (or least bad) option. While conceiving of a
climate emergency as a genuine moral dilemma accounts for some ethical worries we might have
about SRM, it requires the very controversial claim that there are genuine moral dilemmas and it
potentially undermines moral action-guidance in emergency scenarios. Instead, I argue that it is
better to conceive of climate emergencies as situations calling for agent-regret regarding both
previous moral failures that have caused such emergencies and the moral disvalue that
deployment produces. This allows us coherently to hold SRM deployment may be morally
problematic even if it ought to be deployed in some situation.
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The Lesser of Two Evils Argument and the Moral Dilemma Objection
Some proponents of SRM research argue that deployment of SRM could be justified in
climate emergencies. 6 Roughly, the argument is that in some scenarios SRM could be preferable
to any other available option, and therefore deployment could be justified or permitted in such
cases as “the lesser of two evils.” Call this the Lesser of Two Evils Argument (LTEA) for SRM,
which we may present as follows:

The Lesser of Two Evils Argument
(1): All available options for responding to a climate emergency are likely to be
bad options.
(2): If we are forced to choose among exclusively bad options, then we ought to
choose the best of those bad options.
(3): In a climate emergency, deployment of SRM is likely to be the best option.
(4): So in a climate emergency, it is likely the case that we ought to deploy SRM.

At first glance, the argument seems to have some plausibility. However, some philosophers have
critiqued LTEA by suggesting that some climate emergencies might constitute genuine moral
dilemmas, or scenarios in which it is impossible to avoid moral wrong-doing. 7 If that is the case,
then deploying SRM in a climate emergency would be morally impermissible even if it is the
best option available, given that such a scenario would be a tragic situation in which all courses
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of action would be morally impermissible. Call this the Moral Dilemma Objection (MDO) to
SRM. 8
One might have some initial sympathy for both LTEA and MDO. On the one hand, it
seems reasonable to think that, in a climate emergency, we would have reason to take the best
option available. After all, however problematic it might be, the best option is by definition
better than all others. This seems to favor the thought that SRM would be permissible in such an
emergency, provided that it is in fact the best option. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to
find SRM to be morally problematic, given its potential for harm and injustice to present and
future parties. For this reason, an agent’s deployment of SRM might entail what Gardiner calls a
“marring evil,” which licenses “a serious negative moral assessment of that agent’s life
considered as a whole.” 9 This seems to favor the thought that SRM could be morally
impermissible, regardless of whether it is better than other available options in some scenario. I
shall examine LTEA and MDO in greater detail below. For now, I suggest only that it is prima
facie plausible to treat each of these as a reasonable position.
Yet there is an obvious tension between LTEA and MDO. One option for resolving this
tension is a wholesale acceptance of one and wholesale rejection of the other. 10 However, it
would be preferable instead to maintain as many of the plausible features of both LTEA and
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MDO as possible, given that each position seems to have a reasonable rationale. In this paper, I
argue that we have good reason to question MDO’s conceptualization of climate emergencies as
genuine moral dilemmas. While viewing such emergencies as genuinely dilemmatic would
underwrite the plausible judgment that deploying SRM would be morally problematic in some
ways, that view seems incompatible with the plausible judgment that in climate emergencies we
ought to adopt the best option available. Since it is impossible to avoid moral wrong-doing in a
genuine moral dilemma, there simply is no course of action we ought to adopt in such a situation
(at least in a moral sense of “ought”). This is an unfortunate implication for MDO. In a climate
emergency in which all available options would (say) result in substantial net harm, but where
one option is substantially less harmful than the others and all else of moral relevance is equal, it
is difficult to deny that we ought to adopt that least harmful option. 11 Yet if that emergency is
genuinely dilemmatic, then we must deny this, because the least harmful option still would entail
moral wrong-doing.
Yet even if LTEA is sound, it would be unsatisfactory to advocate deploying SRM in a
climate emergency without further consideration of other moral issues. Let us imagine some
climate emergency in which SRM would be the best option available, and let us imagine
someone who, convinced by LTEA, cavalierly advocates SRM and takes an active role in its
deployment, all while washing his hands of any of the morally questionable features of SRM.
Call this kind of person the Satisfied Geoengineer. He might reason as follows: “A climate
emergency leaves us limited options. Since SRM is the best of those options, we ought to deploy
it. Although this will result in substantial harm to various parties, we should not regard our
decision to deploy SRM as morally problematic. After all, it is the best option available, and so
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there is nothing morally suspect about deploying it.” We should worry that this kind of rationale
overlooks morally salient features of both climate emergencies and SRM deployment. In
particular, it ignores the presumable moral failure that created the climate emergency in the first
place, it ignores the moral disvalue produced by SRM, and it ignores the moral impact that SRM
deployment may have on the lives of those agents who deploy it. 12 MDO has the advantage of
addressing these matters, but only at the cost of implying that no option is permissible in an
(allegedly dilemmatic) emergency scenario.
Rather than viewing climate emergencies as moral dilemmas, I argue below that it is
more plausible to view them as cases in which agent-regret is appropriate. It can be the case that
some action is morally permissible (or even morally obligatory) and yet calls for agent-regret on
the part of whomever performs that action. Assuming that it is the best option in some climate
emergency, it is at least coherent to hold both that we ought to deploy SRM and that we ought to
harbor agent-regret for doing so. As I shall argue, an agent-regret account allows us to hold onto
the thought behind LTEA that SRM might be permissible in conceivable cases, yet it also allows
us to assess the Satisfied Geoengineer’s posture as morally problematic, because he lacks an
attitude of regret that he ought to have. Before presenting this argument, however, I first suggest
some reasons to be skeptical that climate emergencies would involve genuine moral dilemmas.

Skepticism Regarding Moral Dilemmas in General
There are reasons to doubt that climate emergencies are genuine moral dilemmas. First,
one might be skeptical that there are any genuine moral dilemmas, given that they seem to be
inconsistent with very plausible moral principles. Perhaps most obviously, the principle of
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“ought implies can” holds that if a moral agent is morally obligated to perform some action (or to
abstain from doing so), then it must be possible for that moral agent to perform that action (or to
abstain from doing so). A genuine moral dilemma would be inconsistent with “ought implies
can,” because it is by definition a scenario in which it is impossible to do as one ought. If some
climate emergency would be a genuine moral dilemma because all available options (including
doing nothing) would be morally impermissible, then it would be impossible for a moral agent to
act as she ought in that situation. If “ought implies can” is a conceptual truth, then such scenarios
cannot hold. 13 In order to preserve this principle as a conceptual truth, it must always be possible
for an agent to do what she ought to do, no matter how grim the situation. In a climate
emergency then, assuming this moral principle, at least one option must be morally permissible.
One response to this is to deny that “ought implies can” is a conceptual (or even a
necessary) truth yet maintain that the principle admits of exception in only rare, special cases.
Along these lines, one might suggest that there are genuine, self-imposed moral dilemmas.
Arguably, this variety of dilemma does not threaten the plausible thought behind “ought implies
can,” although the existence of such a genuine dilemma would disqualify that principle as a
conceptual (or even a necessary) truth. Perhaps “ought implies can” holds in almost all cases, but
not those in which an agent’s own wrong-doing has made it impossible for him to satisfy his
obligations. The standard example of this is making incompatible promises. 14 If I promise
George that I will watch a movie with him at his house at 6:00 pm on Monday, and if I then
promise Terrence that I will go for a walk with him outdoors at 6:00 pm on Monday, it is not
possible for me to keep both promises. Presumably, I am obligated to keep each promise, and
therefore I am obligated to keep both promises. But this is impossible, since doing so would
13

Michael J Zimmerman, The Concept of Moral Obligation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Terrance C. McConnell, “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2
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require me to be in two different places at once. Instead, I must break at least one of my
promises, and arguably this would be morally wrong to do. If so, then this would be a case of a
genuine moral dilemma. How should we view this case? We might view breaking my promise to
Terrence or George (or both) as morally wrong, even though it is impossible to avoid breaking at
least one of these promises. In that case, the situation would be genuinely dilemmatic. Although
this is inconsistent with “ought implies can,” we might find this philosophically untroubling,
given that the dilemma was created through my own fault. If previously I had acted as I ought to
have done, I would not have made incompatible promises in the first place. But since I did make
incompatible promises, I have only myself to blame for the existence of this genuine dilemma,
which now forces me to act as I ought not to act.
Dilemmas of this self-imposed variety are at least less mysterious than other varieties.
For example, we might be suspicious of the claim that there are “externally” imposed dilemmas,
or scenarios in which an agent is forced into moral wrong-doing through no fault of her own,
such as through the impermissible actions of others. This kind of exception to “ought implies
can” seems particularly implausible. In contrast, self-imposed moral dilemmas arguably do not
violate the spirit behind “ought implies can.” If an agent acts as she ought to act, then selfimposed moral dilemmas arguably will not arise. It is only when an agent acts wrongly that selfimposed dilemmas are created, and so it is within one’s power to prevent such dilemmas from
arising for oneself.
It is tempting to view climate emergencies as self-imposed moral dilemmas. I assume that
we have a moral obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 15 If we do not fulfill this
obligation, we reasonably can expect to reach a point in the future at which we are committed to
dangerous climate change, including threshold collapses in the climate system, the impacts of
15
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which could be severely harmful while also outstripping our adaptive capacities. This future
point is plausibly construed as a climate emergency. One might view such an emergency as a
self-imposed moral dilemma, since it arises from our past moral failure to reduce our emissions.
Proponents of MDO might then reason as follows. While “ought implies can” is a reasonable
moral principle that holds in most cases, exceptions to it can arise due to our own moral wrongdoing in previous, non-dilemmatic cases. In failing to make obligatory cuts to our emissions, we
risk imposing a future dilemma on ourselves. In a climate emergency that we could have
avoided, we might no longer be able to act as we ought to act, but this merely reflects our past
decision not to comply with our moral obligations.
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that there are genuine moral dilemmas of the
self-imposed variety. Having granted this, it is unclear that a climate emergency would meet the
conditions necessary for it to be plausibly considered an instance of one. Up to this point, I
intentionally have been vague concerning the agents involved in some putatively dilemmatic
climate emergency. Yet a scenario counts as a self-imposed moral dilemma only if the agent who
faces it is identical to the agent who imposed it—otherwise, a scenario could not be a selfimposed dilemma. In the case of incompatible promises, I am the agent who wrongly makes the
promises to both George and Terrence, and I am also the agent who must break at least one of
those promises. But there are reasons to doubt that the agents who culpably fail to cut their
emissions and thereby create a climate emergency would be identical to the agents who face that
allegedly dilemmatic emergency.

11
First, there are well-known challenges to determining what agents are obligated to reduce
their emissions. 16 Clearly, the class of agents so obligated is non-identical to the class of
greenhouse gas emitters. It would be deeply implausible to hold that the global poor are
obligated to cut emissions that are necessary for their own subsistence, for example. 17 We need
some plausible criteria for identifying emitters who are obligated to cut their emissions, and this
presumably would involve specifying some emissions threshold that emitters ought not to
surpass. A further question here is what kind of agent we should be trying to identify, whether
individuals, states, corporations, or some combination of these. 18 Further, there are difficult
questions regarding historical emissions. It would be implausible to hold that early twentiethcentury emitters were obligated to cut their emissions, since the risks of climate change were not
well understood at the time. But at what historical point did emitters become morally culpable
for their emissions? These challenges are relevant here because, if we are to determine whether
some climate emergency is a self-imposed moral dilemma, we need to know whether the agents
who are morally culpable for the emergency are identical to those who face it, and this requires
becoming clear on who those culpable agents are.
Even if these difficult questions can be answered plausibly, there is a second challenge
for the view that climate emergencies are self-imposed moral dilemmas, namely that the class of
agents responding to a climate emergency is likely to be non-identical to the class of agents
culpable for that emergency itself. To begin with, these two classes can be temporally distinct
from each other. For example, the wrongful emissions of one generation could ensure some
16

Christian Baatz, “Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those Vulnerable to Climate
Change in Developing Countries,” Ethics, Policy & Environment 16, no. 1 (2013): 94–110,
doi:10.1080/21550085.2013.768397.
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18
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threshold event (e.g., the collapse of a major ice sheet) that, due to inertia in the climate system,
would occur only at some point in the future. In such a case, a future generation might face the
decision of whether or not to deploy SRM to avert this otherwise-imminent threshold collapse.
But if this would be a genuine moral dilemma for the future generation, it is not a self-imposed
one, since those who face the emergency are not identical to those who caused it. This is relevant
here because very few proponents of SRM research argue for near-term deployment of SRM. 19
Rather, such proponents tend to argue that research is needed now because deployment might be
needed in a future emergency. 20
Moreover, even putting questions of temporal distinctness to one side, there still could be
cases of non-identity between the culpable agents of some climate emergency and those who
must respond to it. For example, the very existence of some small-island states is threated by sealevel rise. Given continued emissions, averting such sea-level rise might become impossible
without deployment of SRM. Presumably, this would count as a climate emergency for affected
states. Faced with such an emergency scenario, one such state might choose to deploy SRM to
stabilize the climate and preserve its own territory. 21 Given the low per capita and overall
emissions of small-island states, it is not plausible to treat them (nor their citizens) as culpable
agents of the climate emergency they would face in that scenario. Once again, if this climate
emergency would be a moral dilemma for the state threatened by it, it is not plausibly viewed as
a self-imposed one.

19
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Finally, there could be cases of partial but incomplete overlap between the set of agents
culpable for a climate emergency and the set of agents tasked with responding to it. That is, those
who face a climate emergency could be “mixed,” including some who were obligated to reduce
their emissions but failed to do so, as well as some (perhaps many) who were not so obligated.
This makes it more difficult to evaluate whether the emergency scenario could be a self-imposed
moral dilemma. Describing deployment of SRM by a “mixed” set of agents as morally wrong
because of the past wrong-doing of only some members of that set seems implausible. Why
should the actions of those who are not culpable for the climate emergency be morally tainted by
the previous wrong-doing of their collaborators? Now one might reply that only agents culpable
for the climate emergency would act wrongly in deploying SRM, whereas their collaborators
would not act wrongly in joining them. But this has the very implausible implication that a single
deployment of SRM both is and is not morally wrong.

Action-Guidance in Climate Emergencies
Putting aside the concerns just mentioned, the view that climate emergencies are
genuinely dilemmatic has the further problem that it leaves us with little prospect for moral
action-guidance in such cases. A genuine moral dilemma is a situation in which no available
course of action is morally permissible and thus a situation in which it is impossible for an agent
to avoid moral wrong-doing. It would be very odd to hold that we (morally) ought to take an
(morally) impermissible course of action. If all available courses of action are morally wrong,
then arguably it is not the case that any of them ought to be adopted, at least in a moral sense of
“ought.” Therefore, in a genuine moral dilemma, there seems to be no answer to the question of
how we should act. For if there was an answer to this question, then there would be some action
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we ought to take, and an action we ought to take must be a permissible one. But there are no
permissible actions in a genuine moral dilemma.
This is at least a serious drawback for MDO, since it would be valuable to know how we
ought to act in an emergency. Further, in a climate emergency, there could be many feasible
courses of action that differ markedly in their prospects for causing harm and injustice. For
instance, it seems that in such a scenario we would have moral reason to prefer some less
harmful or unjust option over some more harmful or unjust option, all else being equal. Indeed,
recognition that some options are “lesser evils” seems implicitly to grant this. Yet it is difficult
to see how we could make sense of this in a genuine moral dilemma. If all available courses of
action are morally wrong, then we seem to be prohibited from taking any of those courses. An
implication of this is that, contrary to our intuitions, we would lack sufficiently good moral
reason to adopt substantially less harmful or unjust options over those that are more harmful or
unjust, even assuming all else is equal among those options. Treating a climate emergency as a
genuine moral dilemma therefore seems to undercut potentially helpful action-guidance we
might have received from moral theory. It leaves us at a loss regarding how we ought to act in
such cases, and this is unfortunate.
One advantage of LTEA is that it provides moral action-guidance in emergency
scenarios. Given a situation in which all our options are bad ones, LTEA directs us to choose the
least bad option. The argument contends that, in a climate emergency, this likely would be SRM.
At least in principle, we can determine whether or not this would be the case. While virtually no
proponent of SRM research thinks that deployment of SRM is a desirable goal in its own right,
many such proponents are sympathetic to something resembling LTEA. Particularly in an
emergency scenario, some hold that there is good reason to think SRM could be preferable to
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other available options. 22 This is compatible with thinking that SRM is morally problematic. A
Tentative Geoengineer could reason as follows: “Deployment of SRM is morally problematic in
various ways. It could cause substantial harm and injustice to present and future persons. We
instead ought to make substantial cuts in our emissions in order to avoid dangerous climate
change in the future. Ideally, if we reduce emissions as we ought, SRM would not be necessary
in the future. But if we continue to fail in cutting our emissions substantially, the situation may
need to be reassessed. In a climate emergency, it could be too late for emissions cuts to avoid
dangerous climate change, and adaptive measures may be insufficient to prepare for it. In such a
scenario, if some SRM technique was better than all other available options, then we ought to
deploy that SRM technique. Despite its moral problems, doing so is morally preferable to all
other options. Therefore, in that situation, it ought to be deployed.”
There is much to question about LTEA, of course. We might be skeptical that a climate
emergency could be anticipated with sufficient confidence that SRM could be deployed in time
to avert it, and we might be skeptical that SRM would indeed be the best option in such an
emergency. For the sake of argument, however, let us suppose with the Tentative Geoengineer
that deployment of SRM would be the best option available in some scenario. Assuming that is
true, it seems reasonable to hold that we ought to deploy SRM. A weakness of MDO is that it
does not address the Tentative Geoengineer’s reasoning, since the objection merely notes that
SRM is morally impermissible even in the kind of case just described. The Tentative
Geoengineer might reply, “Yes, SRM is morally problematic, but what else ought we to do in a
climate emergency?” I suggest that the proponent of MDO cannot offer a plausible answer to this
question. If a climate emergency is a genuine moral dilemma, then there is no option that we
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ought to adopt, since all courses of action would be morally impermissible in that emergency.
This is deeply unsatisfying, and the Tentative Geoengineer has ground for complaint. One task of
moral theory is to provide action-guidance in difficult cases, but MDO seems to undermine any
prospect for such action-guidance in those scenarios in which it may be needed most. This is a
very serious drawback of viewing climate emergencies as genuine moral dilemmas.

SRM and Agent-Regret
We have examined some reasons to be skeptical of MDO: it is incompatible with
plausible moral principles, and it undermines moral action-guidance in scenarios alleged to be
dilemmatic. However, we should not ignore the advantages of MDO, namely that it offers an
explanation of why both SRM deployment and the figure of the Satisfied Geoengineer are
morally problematic. MDO is able to explain these—or more precisely, the individual advancing
MDO easily can explain these—by claiming that such deployment would be morally
impermissible even if it was the best (or least bad) option available. However, we can explain
these phenomena without taking on the disadvantages of MDO. We can do this by maintaining
that SRM deployment calls for agent-regret. This allows us to preserve “ought implies can,” and
it allows for moral action-guidance in such emergencies. In this section, I first sketch what would
be involved in feeling agent-regret as a response to deployment of SRM. I then argue that it is
appropriate to feel agent-regret in such a case.
Associated with Bernard Williams, agent-regret is a type of regret one harbors toward
some action of one’s own or a collective action in which one has participated. This regret may be
informed by thoughts regarding how one might have acted differently than one did in fact act. 23
Agent-regret need not pertain to morally culpable actions. One might feel agent-regret for actions
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that she is not blameworthy for performing, such as in Williams’ example of someone who is
driving safely and kills a child who suddenly runs into the road. Agent-regret is therefore not
limited to genuinely dilemmatic scenarios. Importantly, agent-regret is not necessarily a
phenomenon of wishing that one had acted differently in a given set of circumstances. Instead,
agent-regret could involve wishing that those past circumstances themselves had been different,
that they had afforded different options, or that the course of action taken had not entailed certain
consequences. Williams notes, “Regret necessarily involves a wish that things had been
otherwise, for instance that one had not had to act as one did. But it does not necessarily involve
the wish, all things taken together, that one had acted otherwise.” 24
In the case of a climate emergency, it is at least coherent to judge that some course of
action is morally permissible (or even obligatory) and to partake in that action while also
harboring agent-regret, since such regret need not involve judging one’s action to have been
impermissible. The application to SRM is apparent. If it was the case in some climate emergency
that SRM deployment was the best option available, then it would be reasonable to hold that
deployment was morally permissible, but it would be coherent simultaneously to regret that such
a drastic measure was needed, and it would be coherent to regret one’s own participation in that
deployment. One could regret the circumstance of one’s participation in the deployment, for
example that SRM was needed (as we are supposing for the moment) in the wake of our moral
failure to mitigate our emissions. One also could regret the outcome of one’s permissible action,
for example that SRM deployment likely would result in serious harm and injustice to some
parties. Despite these regrets, however, this agent could hold consistently that SRM morally
ought to be deployed in those unfortunate circumstances, since agent-regret may be directed
toward morally permissible actions.
24
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Agent-regret is not merely an attitude that it is coherent to have in such a case, but it is
also an appropriate one. Supposing that SRM is morally preferable to all other options in a
climate emergency, one should regret the circumstances that make this the case, and one should
regret the harm and injustice that one’s involvement in deployment might cause. It is appropriate
to harbor agent-regret here for at least two reasons. First, the context in which SRM deployment
is (as we are supposing) morally permissible depends upon serious moral wrong-doing in the
past. An agent participating in SRM deployment in such a context should regret that this past
wrong-doing has forced her into such a bad situation, even if she is not among those who are
guilty of this past wrong-doing. Regretting this fact involves recognizing that SRM likely would
be unnecessary in a world in which moral agents largely complied with their obligations. Agentregret allows one to countenance the fact that deploying SRM in a climate emergency, even if
morally justified, signals an enormous moral failure on the part of the many agents who were
obligated to reduce their emissions but opted not to do so. This moral failure would then have
created a set of circumstances in which it falls to certain agents to adopt a morally problematic
option, one that never should have been needed. This surely would be something worth
lamenting.
Second, it is plausible that we should harbor agent-regret for those of our actions that
create substantial moral disvalue. As I have noted above, SRM has the potential to result in
serious harm and injustice, both of which carry substantial moral disvalue. One thought in LTEA
is that, in a climate emergency, all available options are likely to be bad. Imagine, for example,
that all such options likely would involve substantial harm and injustice, but that there is good
reason to believe SRM would involve less harm and less injustice than any other option. The
proponent of LTEA takes it that (assuming all else of moral relevance to be equal) SRM ought to
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be deployed in that case. But holding this is compatible with recognizing that SRM likely would
produce substantial moral disvalue. Suppose that SRM is deployed and causes drought in some
regions, thus substantially harming many persons. It is morally bad that SRM results in this
harm, even if its deployment was morally permissible. Likewise, it is morally bad for our
permissible actions to cause injustice, such as if permissible SRM deployment puts future
generations at risk of the termination problem. Even if we grant that LTEA is sound, we
nonetheless ought to recognize that SRM could create many instances of moral disvalue. An
agent of SRM deployment ought to feel agent-regret for helping to bring about that disvalue.
Causing harm or injustice is a bad thing, even if doing so is justified in some case.
The Satisfied Geoengineer would lack agent-regret, and it is why this figure is morally
problematic. Harboring agent-regret for neither the circumstances in which he acts nor the moral
disvalue his actions produce, the Satisfied Geoengineer simply would note that SRM is the best
course of action in a climate emergency, conclude that it therefore ought to be deployed, and
give no further thought to the moral features of that decision. This figure is rather similar to a
driver who, having killed a child through no fault of her own, feels no agent-regret for her action.
She might say, “The death is unfortunate, but I regret it in the same way as non-participants of
the event regret it—like an onlooker, I view it as a bad thing that the child died. But why should I
feel agent-regret for the child’s death? After all, I was driving at the speed limit, and it was the
child’s fault for running into the road without looking first.” As Williams notes, we would feel
“some doubt” regarding a person who reasoned in this way. 25 We tend to think that the driver
should regret that she killed the child, however unavoidable that death may have been. In
conjunction with that regret, she could wish (counter to fact) that she had been able to apply the
brakes in time or that the child had not been seriously harmed by the collision. Further, she could
25
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recognize the moral disvalue of the harm caused to the child and to those who care about that
child. Someone who cavalierly eschews such regret seems to engage in morally questionable
behavior.

The Advantages of an Agent-Regret Account
The Satisfied Geoengineer would be morally problematic because he lacks agent-regret
for an action that both occurs within a context created by a past moral failure and produces
substantial moral disvalue in the form of harm and injustice. By relying on this agent-regret
account, we can avoid the controversial commitments of MDO without condoning the way in
which the Satisfied Geoengineer goes about deployment. Whereas MDO controversially holds
that there are genuine moral dilemmas and undercuts moral action-guidance in climate
emergencies, the agent-regret account allows us to disapprove of the Satisfied Geoengineer while
also admitting that SRM may be morally permissible or even obligatory in some contexts.
Accepting the latter account opens the following possibility. We might deny that a climate
emergency would constitute a genuine moral dilemma, hold that there is some permissible action
that may be taken (or some obligatory action that ought to be taken) in that context, and rely on
some moral theory to guide our subsequent decision and course of action. We can recognize that
a climate emergency is a very bad situation, one created by an enormous moral failure in our
past, and we ought to regret that this is the case. Whatever course of action we choose (SRM or
otherwise), we can recognize that it may result in harmful and unjust outcomes, and we also
ought to regret that our action produces such outcomes. However, those regrets need not lead to
moral paralysis. We can hold that some course of action ought to be taken despite its problems,
provided that we feel agent-regret when appropriate.
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These considerations undercut much of the motivation for accepting MDO, because they
show that we need not conceive of SRM as morally impermissible in order to account for its
problematic features. Gardiner suggests that how we view arguments like LTEA may depend on
whether we think there are genuine moral dilemmas. Those who believe in such dilemmas may
be “reluctant to consider SRM even as a last resort, and even then are unhappy about having to
do so.” The concern is that those who endorse LTEA “do not really seem to address the core
concerns” of those individuals who believe in genuine moral dilemmas. 26 However, if the
foregoing is correct, then perhaps a proponent of LTEA can address these concerns. Unlike the
Satisfied Geoengineer, one might endorse LTEA while feeling the appropriate agent-regret,
recognizing the moral problems of SRM while also holding that it ought to be deployed. In this
way, we can reject the posture of the Satisfied Geoengineer without taking on the controversial
baggage of MDO. These considerations also suggest that LTEA is defensible in at least one
respect. If geoengineering really was the best option in some scenario, then it seems reasonable
to hold that it would be permissible, perhaps even obligatory, to deploy it in that scenario. MDO
implausibly denies this. Conversely, my account is compatible with this particular claim of
LTEA. This gives us a reason to prefer the agent-regret account over MDO’s position that SRM
(like all other options) would be morally wrong in a climate emergency.
To reiterate, I am not endorsing LTEA. There are many other questions about that
argument that would need to be addressed before any such endorsement. For example, it is far
from clear that some form of SRM would in fact be the best option available in a climate
emergency. Becoming clear on this would require further consideration of what would count as
the best (or least bad) option in such a case, a task that I am unable to pursue here. However, the
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conditional premise of LTEA, namely that SRM ought to be deployed if it is the best option, is
plausible. The agent-regret account can accept this while ignoring neither moral failures that
created some climate emergency nor the moral disvalue produced by SRM deployment. While
there might be some other (perhaps fatal) problem with LTEA, MDO is not a convincing
objection.

